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CHAPTER 7
Macroeconomic Volatility, 
Private Investment, Growth, 
and Poverty in Nigeria
By Douglas Addison and Quentin Wodon*
At the time when this paper was written, the latest nationally representative
survey implemented in Nigeria dated back to 1996, and the available estima-
tions suggested that two thirds of the population was poor. This high level 
of poverty was due in large part to macroeconomic volatility that depressed
private investment and growth. Using cross-sectional data for 87 countries, we
show that real per-capita growth over the period 1980–1994 was a function of
productivity growth and investment rates, both of which were negatively effected
by volatility (in terms of trade, real exchange rate, and public investments).
When comparing Nigeria to high growth nations, we ﬁnd that most of the growth
differential can be attributed to Nigeria’s higher macroeconomic volatility.
Simulations suggest that if Nigeria had had lower levels of volatility and better
macroeconomic policies, poverty would have been much lower than observed.
According to Nigeria’s Federal Office of Statistics (1999), 66 percent of Nigeria’spopulation was poor in 1996, the latest year for which a nationally representa-tive household survey with consumption information was implemented at the
time this paper was written.27 This paper argues that this high level of poverty was due
*The authors are with the World Bank. This work was completed for recent World Bank (2003, 2004)
studies respectively on policy options for growth in Nigeria, and on poverty and vulnerability in Nigeria.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and need not reﬂect those of the World Bank, its Exec-
utive Directors or the countries they represent.
27. A new household survey has been implemented since then (in 2004) and the data have been made
available for analysis in 2006. New measures of poverty are now available for that survey. However, there
are important issues of comparability between these measures and the measures of poverty obtained for
1996, so we do not make reference in this paper to the new estimates of poverty for 2004. On poverty mea-
surement and growth in Nigeria, see also Canagarajah and Thomas (2001), Aigbokhan (2000), Ali (2000),
Amaghionyeodiwe and Osinubi (2004), and Canagarajah and Thomas (2001).
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to poor growth performance, itself resulting in large part from high macroeconomic
volatility.
Recent empirical and theoretical research has established that macroeconomic volatility
can have an adverse impact on growth. Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers (1993) ﬁnd,
for example, that country characteristics alone are not sufﬁcient to explain cross-country
growth patterns, with external shocks being an important part of the story. Similarly,
Bleaney and Greenaway (2002) ﬁnd that real growth is negatively affected by terms of trade
volatility. As shown by Bleaney and Greenaway (2000) and Serven (2002), one of the chan-
nels through which macro shocks affect growth is through a negative impact on private
investment, as ﬁrm managers are hesitant to invest if future economic conditions are
uncertain (on Nigeria, see Marchat and others 2001).28
The impact of macroeconomic volatility is especially important for relatively poor
countries such as Nigeria which are exposed to terms of trade and exchange rate shocks due
to their dependence on basic commodities such as oil. Nigeria ranked among the most volatile
countries in the world, especially over the period 1980–94 which preceded the 1996 survey
on which ofﬁcial poverty measures are based. Since achieving higher growth in Nigeria is
an urgent priority in order to reduce poverty, an understanding of the impact of macro-
economic volatility on growth is needed.
The objective of this paper is two-fold. In the ﬁrst section, we use cross-sectional data
for 87 countries to analyze the impact of volatility on private investment and growth over the
period 1980–1994, which corresponds to the most volatile period in terms of the behavior
of Nigeria’s macroeconomic indicators. Nigeria’s private sector invested an average only
7 percent of GDP per annum between 1980 and 199429, which is well below the average of
20 percent invested by the world’s fastest growing economies, leading to an average year-
to-year growth in per capita GDP of only 0.2 percent, and a drop in GDP over the period
as a whole due to severe losses in the early 1980s. Our empirical framework consists of two
regression equations. The first seeks to explain real per-capita growth as a function of
productivity growth and investment rates where the former is a function of volatility and
the latter are given. The second equation seeks to explain the private investment rate as a
function of openness to trade, institutional quality and volatility. Our key ﬁndings are that
volatility indeed is detrimental for growth, with both direct negative effects on growth, and
indirect negative effects through a dampening impact on private investment.
28. This is especially true when the ﬁnancial system is weak. One explanation for the ability of a strong
ﬁnancial system to reduce the negative impact of volatility is provided by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997),
who suggest that there is a virtuous circle whereby risk is reduced by wealth and portfolio diversiﬁcation
while the investment needed for diversiﬁcation is encouraged by falling risk and rising wealth. In a related
paper, Denizer and others (2002) ﬁnd empirical support for the positive effect that ﬁnancial systems have
in reducing macroeconomic volatility. It is important to note here that Nigerian ﬁrm managers complain
about inadequate access to ﬁnance more often than any other problem except uncertainty and poor infra-
structure (Marchat and others 2001). Lack of credit forces enterprises to rely on internally generated funds
both for working capital and for investment. This hampers ﬁrms’ ability to manage their working capital,
making it difﬁcult for them to increase sales and operate at full capacity. The shortage of ﬁnance also lim-
its investments to improve technology, to lower costs and to expand output. The high cost and limited
availability of credit is thus a major factor that raises the cost of doing business and lowers competitive-
ness in Nigeria.
29. The Federal Ofﬁce of Statistics does not divide investment into government and private contri-
butions. This estimate is from a World Bank database where private investment equals total investment
less government investment.
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Next, in the second section, we use the results from the ﬁrst section to measure what
poverty might have been in 1996—the latest year for which a nationally representative
survey with consumption data is available in Nigeria—if the country had not suffered from
high macroeconomic volatility. For this, four scenarios are considered, with each scenario
resulting in progressively higher levels of private investment and growth. Apart from pro-
viding an indication of what counterfactual poverty measures might have been observed
in 1996 under these alternative macroeconomic scenario, we also look at the magnitude of
progress that the country could achieve by 2015 in terms of poverty reduction if it were
able to implement policies that would lead to such macroeconomic outcomes.
Assessing the Cost of Macroeconomic Volatility
Macroeconomic Volatility and Growth
To model the determinants of growth, including the impact of macroeconomic volatility,
we start with the basic Mankiw-Romer-Weil (hereafter MRW, 1992) model. Growth in
GDP per worker depends on the savings rates sk and sh for physical and human capital, as
well as on labor force growth n and capital decay δ, and productivity growth g. In MRW,
sk is proxied by the period average investment-to-GDP ratio, I/Y. Here, to see the relative
impact of both public (Ig) versus private (Ip) investment, the variable sk will be divided into
private and government sector investment ratios. Because public investment may have a
lower impact in countries with the least stable public investment rates, we also include a
variable that interacts the logged government investment rate with the standard deviation
of the government investment rate. Next, while in MRW sh is proxied by the product of the
secondary enrollment rate times the population of school aged children, we follow Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994) who show that population multiplied by average educational attainment
in years of schooling may be a better measure for sh (again, we use period averages for each
country). As in MRW, we assume an exogenous and constant rate of decay δ for both phys-
ical and human capital, and the labor force is proxied by population. Denoting the error
term by μ, and accounting for baseline per capita GDP, we have:
In (1), a key modiﬁcation versus MRW’s model is that we will let productivity growth vary
across countries through a vector of variables Z. This vector includes the standard deviation
of the terms of trade, following Bleaney and Greenaway (2002) who ﬁnd real growth is neg-
atively affected by TOT instability. The average growth rate of each nations’ OECD trade
partners is also included following Easterly (2001) who ﬁnds that OECD recessions con-
tributed to slower growth in the rest of the worlds’ economies. Likewise, openness to trade
(as measured by share of the sum of exports and imports in GDP), is included following
Edwards (1998) and others who found openness contributes to growth.30 Finally, we include
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30. This remains the subject of debate. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), for example, agree that there is no
credible evidence that trade restrictions contribute to growth, but disagree that trade openness unambigu-
ously contributes to growth. They argue the contribution from openness is contingent upon other variables.
a measure of good governance and respect for property rights following Hall and Jones
(1999) who ﬁnd this is an important determinant of productivity. Similarly, Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) show that countries scoring higher on indices of rule of
law, graft, voice and accountability tend to have lower infant mortality and higher literacy
rates, as well as higher per capita incomes.31
The regression is estimated using a cross-country sample of 87 countries for the
period 1980–94. Table 7.1 shows the results. Three variables appear to be insignificant
at the 10 percent confidence level: the stock of human capital, the trade share and the
quality of governance. Further testing of the results suggests only the latter two can be
eliminated. The modified results are shown in column B. The regression results required
the addition of three dummy variables for Botswana, Ghana and Uganda in order to
make the error term (residual) normally distributed. The conclusion that none of the
remaining variables can be rejected is not altered when the dummies are removed. This
regression passes the RESET test for mis-specification but does display some hetero-
skedasticity corrected by using White’s heteroskedastic-consistent estimators.
Note that if volatility in public investment is driven by TOT volatility, collinearity between
the interactive public investment term and TOT volatility could weaken the statistical sig-
niﬁcance of, and/or change the sign of, the coefﬁcient for TOT volatility. The results in
Table 7.1 suggest, however, that both types of volatility—in TOTs and in public investment—
have a negative impact on growth. In column C, human capital is eliminated since it is not
statistically signiﬁcant (this does not imply that there is no beneﬁt from schooling: the pub-
lic investment term continues to capture the beneﬁcial impact of investments in schooling
and other services).
Two more tests were made on the results in column C. The ﬁrst uses the Hausmann
test for contemporaneous correlation between the private sector investment rate and the
error term. This could occur either due to omitted variables or endogeneity. The instru-
ments used for this test come from the investment equation described below where the
measurement of volatility is based on the real exchange rate.32 The results failed to reject
the null hypothesis of no contemporaneous correlation. The second test uses Bayesian
Averaging of Classical Estimates as documented in Dopplehofer et al. (2000) to reveal
weaknesses in the choice of variables when there are many regressors with collinearity, so
that the sign and signiﬁcance of one or more variables may not be stable when other vari-
ables are added to, or subtracted from, the regression. Column D of Table 7.1 reports that
most of the variables are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the remaining variables in
the equation. The exceptions, when signiﬁcance is conditional upon other variables, are
the stock of human capital, the trade share and the measure of governance.
31. There are debatable assumptions in this model. In particular, one might question whether all
countries are in fact converging to their steady-states as is assumed in the MRW formulation. The main
utility of the augmented Solow model is its widespread acceptance and good results in terms of ﬁt. One
can also debate the choices of variables used. The ﬁnal and authoritative word on what drives growth, and
what does not, has yet to be spoken (see Soludo and Kim [2002] for a provocative survey of the current
state of play in growth theory). Growth researchers are particularly vexed by the way many different vari-
ables tend to cluster together. For example, the wealthiest nations tend to have more open economies, low
tariffs, low inﬂation, strong adherence to the rule of law and, often, practice democracy. This can lead to
the conclusion that ‘everything counts’ with little guidance on what a nation’s priorities should be.
32. The results do not change when the measure of volatility is based on the TOT.
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Aa Ba Ca Dg
Constant
Coefﬁcient 0.45 −0.68 3.38
Probability 0.92 0.86 0.39
Initial GDP per Capitab
Coefﬁcient −0.92 −0.46 −0.42
Probability 0.01 0.10 0.10 Robust
Private Investment Rateb
Coefﬁcient 1.59 1.91 2.22
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 Robust
Gov’t Investment Rateb
Coefﬁcient 0.78 0.92 1.37
Probability 0.06 0.01 0.00 Robust
Gov’t Investment RateSD Gov’t Investment Rate
Coefﬁcient −2.12
Probability 0.00 Robust
Stock of Human Capitalb
Coefﬁcient 0.25 0.27
Probability 0.19 0.03 Conditional
Labor Growth & Depreciationb
Coefﬁcient −3.96 −5.06 −4.81
Probability 0.01 0.00 0.00 Robust
OECD Partner Growth
Coefﬁcient 2.58 2.55 2.09
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 Robust
Trade Share (% of GDP)
Coefﬁcient 0.00
Probability 0.87 Conditional
Governance & Property Rights
Coefﬁcient 2.68
Probability 0.19 Conditional
Standard Deviation in TOT Growth Squared
Coefﬁcient −0.08 −0.09 −0.07
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 Robust
Observations 87 87 87
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.64 0.66
Hausmann (Probability)c 0.45 0.30 0.26
Normal residual rejected ?d No No No
White (Probability)e 0.44 0.26 0.00
RESET (Probability)f 0.04 0.17 0.14
Table 7.1. Determinants of Growth in Real GDP Per Capita, 1980–94, OLS
a. Calculated with White’s heteroskedastic-consistent estimators.
b. In natural logs.
c. Probability refers to the signiﬁcance of the ﬁtted variable version of Ip/Y.
d. Requires Jarque-Bera statistic smaller than critical value calculated by Deb and Sefton (1996).
e. No cross terms.
f. Probability refers to the signiﬁcance of one ﬁtted variable (squared).
g. Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates. Based on the prior expectation that 10 out of 
14 variables should be signiﬁcant.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Macroeconomic Volatility and Private Investment
Apart from its direct effect on growth, macroeconomic volatility may also have indirect
effects through some of the variables that affect growth. In this section, we also analyze the
extent to which macro volatility dampens private investment, itself a key determinants of
growth as demonstrated in the previous section. Following Bleaney and Greenaway (2000),
we would expect that RER volatility/uncertainty depresses investment. Serven (2002) also
found a negative impact of RER, especially at high levels, possibly implying a thresh-hold
effect, with the impact depending upon the degree of openness to trade and the strength of
the ﬁnancial system. Private investment is reduced by RER uncertainty in nations with low
trade openness and/or weak ﬁnancial systems. Conversely, RER uncertainty appears to
encourage private investment in nations with a high degree of openness and strong ﬁnancial
systems. Finally, we would also expect that good governance and respect for property rights
will encourage private investment.
In our speciﬁcation, the logged private investment rate is a function of the Hall and
Jones (1999) measure of the quality of governance and respect for property rights, the degree
of openness proxied by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP, the strength of
the ﬁnancial system proxied by domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP, real
exchange rate uncertainty proxied either by RER or TOT volatility (that is, the standard
deviation in the growth rate of the RER or TOT), the interaction between RER or TOT
volatility and trade and, lastly, the interaction between RER or TOT volatility and our mea-
sure of ﬁnancial system strength. We thus have:
Table 7.2 provide the regression results. The regression requires dummies for Hungary and
Madagascar to make the residual normally distributed, but it passes the heteroskedasticity
and misspeciﬁcation tests. Private investment is higher with good governance and trade
openness, and lower under RER volatility. The negative impact of volatility is, however,
reduced for nations with strong ﬁnancial systems. In fact, the impact of low to moderate
RER volatility is positive for nations with sufﬁciently strong ﬁnancial systems. When
volatility in TOT is substituted for volatility in RER as the proxy for uncertainty, the results
are similar, except that the proxy for openness no longer remains signiﬁcant. The main
conclusion remains intact: the impact of uncertainty (proxied by volatility) is negative for
nations with weak ﬁnancial systems.
Summary Results: Comparing Nigeria to High Growth Economies
In Table 7.3, the regression results have been transformed to provide a simple account
of the contribution of various variables to growth. Nigeria’s performance is recorded 
in column A while the average outcomes for a group of 15 high growth countries is in
column B. Column C shows the differential between the two. Row 1 of the top part of the table
give the observed growth rates. Rows 2 through 11 show contributions to growth from var-
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ious variables. There are three major sources of discrepancies between the Nigerian growth
experience and the outcomes in the fastest growing nations. First, the private sectors in the
fast growing nations tend to contribute roughly 2.1 percent per-annum more in growth
than the Nigerian private sector (row 4). Second, the positive effect of demand induced by
OECD trading partner growth is higher for the fast growing nations than for Nigeria, with
the difference at 0.8 percent of growth per year (row 8). Third, volatility in the terms of trade
(row 9) and instability in the government investment rate (row 6) both adversely affect
growth, with a combined growth loss to Nigeria of 2.8 percent per annum.
The simultaneous, negative impact of TOT volatility and instability in the government
investment rate raises a question. If a major source of macroeconomic volatility in most
nations is the TOT (another being capital ﬂows, especially in Latin American countries),
then less TOT volatility should be associated with less government investment volatility.
RER Volatility TOT Volatility
A B C Dd
Constant
Coefﬁcient 1.91 1.88 1.96 2.03
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Governance & Property Rights
Coefﬁcient 0.74 0.98 0.73 0.97
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(X+M)/Y
Coefﬁcient 0.29 0.20 0.22
Probability 0.02 0.06 0.14
DCp/Y
Coefﬁcient 0.21 0.24
Probability 0.27 0.26
Volatility
Coefﬁcient −4.46 −6.95 −5.14 −8.87
Probability 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.01
Volatility  (X+M)/Y
Coefﬁcient −5.37 −7.38
Probability 0.24 0.44
Volatility  DCp/Y
Coefﬁcient 34.56 35.50 37.86 36.07
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Observations 85 85 85 85
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.53
Normal residual rejected ?a No No No No
White (Probability)b 0.63 0.53 0.50 0.04
RESET (Probability)c 0.10 0.61 0.52 0.30
Table 7.2. Determinants of the Logarithm of Private Sector Investment as a Share of GDP,
1980–94, OLS
a. Requires Jarque-Bera statistic smaller than critical value calculated by Deb and Sefton (1996).
b. No cross terms.
c. Probability refers to the signiﬁcance of one ﬁtted variable (squared).
d. Calculated with White’s heteroskedastic-consistent estimators.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
The data appear to support this. In our sample of 87 countries, most of the high TOT
volatility countries displayed a lot of instability in the rate of government investment while
most low TOT countries were also stable government investors. Ideally then, Governments
would aim to reduce TOT volatility, thus making it easier to reduce instability in the gov-
ernment investment rate. However, it is quite possible for governments to make expendi-
ture decisions independently of TOT volatility—and the data show that 23 out 87 countries
did exactly that. Six of the high TOT volatility countries managed to reduce the instability
in their rates of government investment while 17 low TOT volatility countries displayed
high levels of volatility in their rates of government investment. This suggests that ﬁscal
policy choices count, even in the face of strong TOT volatility.
The bottom part of Table 7.3 provides the interpretation of the results for the deter-
minants of private investment. The first row provides the contribution to growth from
private investment. Rows 2 through 7 show impacts on investment from various variables.
Row 2 indicates that Nigeria loses almost half of a percent of growth relative to the perfor-
mance of the fastest growing nations due to the poor quality of governance and respect for
property rights. The country loses another 0.2 percent per annum in growth relative to the
15 High Growth Countries
Nigeria Outcome Differential
A B C
1 Real Growth per Capita 0.24 4.07 3.83
2 Initial Income per Capita, 1979 −3.08 −3.30 −0.22
3 Investment Rates 6.39 8.42 2.03
4 Private 4.39 6.48 2.09
5 Government 3.25 2.90 −0.35
6 Government  (Volatility of Gov’t Inv. Rate) −1.24 −0.96 0.28
7 Population Growth & Capital Decay −9.79 −9.54 0.25
8 Real Growth, OECD Partners 3.35 4.11 0.76
9 Terms of Trade Volatility −1.57 −0.43 1.14
10 Errors and Omissions 1.56 1.43 −0.13
11 Constant 3.38 3.38 0.00
15 High Growth Countries
Nigeria Outcome Differential
A B C
1 Private Sector Investment Rate 4.39 6.48 2.09
2 Governance and Property Rights 0.93 1.41 0.48
3 Openness to Trade 0.25 0.41 0.16
4 RER Volatility −1.99 −0.09 1.90
5 RER Volatility  (Dom. Credit as % GDP) 1.39 0.22 −1.17
6 Error −0.37 0.36 0.73
7 Constant 4.17 4.17 0.00
Table 7.3. Explaining the Growth and Investment Differentials for Nigeria, 1980–94
a. All investment shares have been logged and converted to GDP growth contributions.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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fastest growing nations due to the latter’s greater openness to trade. Rows 4 and 5 indicate
that RER volatility also has a negative impact on private investment led growth, unless the
ﬁnancial sector is sufﬁciently strong. Unfortunately, net credit ﬂows to the private sector for
the period 1980–94 were worth an average of 2.6 percent of current price GDP in Nigeria,
versus 6.6 percent of GDP in high growth countries. This means that Nigeria’s ﬁnancial sec-
tor was weak to overcome the impact of deep RER volatility. Taken together, rows 4 and 5
show that Nigeria loses another 0.6 percent per annum in growth through the private invest-
ment channel. Similar results are obtained when TOT volatility is used instead of ROR
volatility to capture uncertainty.
From Higher Private Investment and Growth to Poverty Reduction
Methodology
A reduction in macroeconomic volatility in Nigeria would help to achieve higher rates of
growth, and thereby lower rates of poverty. The objective of this section is to quantify this gain,
using a number of macroeconomic scenarios and assumptions to relate the scenarios to
poverty reduction.
To construct the macroeconomic scenarios, we assume that the parameter estimates
obtained from the regressions in the previous section apply to the speciﬁc case of Nigeria. This
means that we can use those parameters to simulate various economic scenarios for the
country. Since we don’t have enough (time series) data on Nigeria to test this hypothesis,
it must be acknowledged that our scenarios are indicative only, that is, they are not meant
to be predictions. Each scenario is based on targets for economic, social and institutional
outcomes. These targets are all plausible in the sense that many other nations have already
achieved them. The precise policies needed to achieve these outcomes in Nigeria, however,
are not articulated here, although several key issues are identiﬁed. Again, this exercise is
meant only to provide some indications as to how poverty reduction could be accelerated
through higher per-capita growth under lower levels of macroeconomic volatility.
Next, in order to make the link between growth and poverty reduction, additional
assumptions are needed. A ﬁrst assumption is that growth in per capita GDP in the National
Accounts is perfectly correlated with growth in per capita consumption as would be mea-
sured in household surveys. A second assumption is that growth in real terms, and the
changes in policy that would enable the country to reach a higher level of growth, do not
change the estimation of the poverty lines used for measuring poverty in Nigeria’s 1996 sur-
vey. This means, for example, that relative prices and consumption patterns are not affected
by policy changes implemented in order to reduce macroeconomic volatility. A third
assumption is that inequality in per consumption also does not change with growth and
under alternative macro-scenarios, so that growth is enough to project poverty measures.
Under all these assumptions, assessing the impact of alternative growth scenarios on poverty
is very simple since the procedure simply consists in multiplying the per capita consump-
tion in the 1996 household survey by various factors reﬂecting different growth rates, and
re-computing the poverty measures with the new vector of household consumption.
We use the ﬁrst three poverty measures of the FGT class (Foster and others 1984), namely
the head count (share of the population in poverty), the poverty gap (share of the population
in poverty times the income gap for the poor which depends on the average distance sep-
arating the poor from the poverty line), and the squared poverty gap (which takes into
account the square of the distance separating the poor from the poverty line). If we denote
by z the poverty line, n the number of households (population weighted), q the number of
poor households, and ck the per capita consumption of household k, the ﬁrst three FGT
poverty measures are deﬁned for α equal to zero (head count), one (poverty gap), and two
(squared poverty gap) in the following expression:
Four different scenarios are used to assess the impact that a reduction in volatility and other
reforms could have had on growth and thereby poverty. For each scenario, we provide
counterfactual measures for the value that the FGT poverty measures could have taken in
1996 if macroeconomic volatility had been lower and growth higher during the preceding
sixteen years.
In addition to these four scenarios, we also provide baseline poverty estimates, which
are based on the average year-to-year per capita GDP growth observed over the period
1980–1994. The rationale for this baseline case can be seen in Figure 7.1, which shows the
counterfactual growth paths from 1980 onwards for the various scenarios and the baseline
case. Apart from the actual trend in per capita GDP, there are ﬁve lines in the Figure start-
ing from 1980 onwards. The baseline case corresponds to an average growth rate of 0.2 per-
cent per year, which is the historical average over the period 1980–1994. However, while the
average growth rate was indeed positive over that period, GDP per capita decreased substan-
tially, because Nigeria’s economy collapsed in the early 1980s (a few years of sharp decrease
in GDP per capita followed by a slow recovery may indeed lead to a positive year-to-year
average annual growth rate despite an overall decrease in GDP per capita). When we assess
the impact of reduced volatility and better macroeconomic policies on poverty using sce-
narios one to four, it is best to compare the poverty measures obtained under these scenar-
ios to the baseline case rather than to the actual measures of poverty in 1996, in order not to
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Figure 7.1. Per Capita GDP Under Alternative Macroeconomic Scenarios
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overestimate the reduction in poverty that can be achieved through lower volatility. If we
were comparing the counterfactual macroeconomic scenarios from 1980 onwards with the
actual GDP trend and related poverty in 1996, we would get a very large difference in GDP
and poverty versus 1996, which would overstate the ﬁndings from the regression analysis.
Scenarios and Results
The baseline case is obtained by assuming a year-to-year historical average growth rate of
0.2 percent per year from 1980 until 1996 (although our historical average is based on data
from 1980 to 1994, we continue the simulations up to 1996 which corresponds to the house-
hold survey data year). This results in a baseline poverty head count of 54.9 percent, versus
the 65.6 percent actually observed in the survey. The difference in GDP and poverty levels
between our baseline case and the actual 1996 values is due to the especially sharp drop in GDP
per capita in the ﬁrst half of the 1980s, which can be attributed to a Dutch disease effect33—
an issue that was in part related to macroeconomic volatility, but was not captured as such
in our regression analysis, so that is better to not include this effect in our estimates of the
GDP and poverty gains that could have been achieved under lower volatility and better
macroeconomic management in Nigeria.
The ﬁrst scenario corresponds to the implementation of ambitious macroeconomic
reforms. This includes an expenditure smoothing ﬁscal rule leading to substantial reductions
in the volatility of public expenditures and the real exchange rate. We assume that average
RER volatility is reduced to one third the level observed in 1980–94. Such an outcome is
possible though challenging: only a handful of countries with high TOT volatility were able
to achieve this over the period 1980–94. We also assume also that the volatility in the public
investment rate is reduced to 0.16 (the same as in fast growing nations) from the Nigerian
historical average of 0.25. In addition, we assume that the stock of net domestic credit to the
private sector grows to 20 percent of GDP (which is still far below the average of 44 percent
of GDP achieved by the fast growing nations.) In this ﬁrst scenario, private investment
reaches 9.3 percent of GDP and real growth per-capita increases to 1.5 percent per annum.
If this growth rate is applied from 1980 onwards up to 1996, the poverty head count obtained
for 1996 is 45.5 percent, instead of the baseline case of 54.9 percent.
The second scenario maintains the policy targets set in the ﬁrst scenario and adds two
more. It is assumed that openness to trade is increased by 10 percent of GDP to a period
average of 65 percent of GDP. At the same time, it is assumed that TOT volatility is reduced
by 2015 to almost the same level already achieved by the fast growing nations. In this
scenario, private sector investment reaches 9.5 percent of GDP and real per capita growth
increases to 1.9 percent per year. Applying this growth from 1980 to 1996 yields a poverty
head count in 1996 of 42.4 percent, equivalent to a decrease in head count of 12.5 points
versus the baseline case of 54.9 percent.
33. The Dutch disease refers to the experience of the Netherlands during the 1970s, when natural gas
exports led to an appreciation of the Dutch currency, thereby making other exports less competitive and
leading to unemployment. The Nigerian story of the early 1980s is similar: as both the volume of oil
exports and oil prices increased in the 1970s, Nigeria’s real exchange rate appreciated by 83 percent over
the decade. High inﬂation fueled by heavy government spending induced the real exchange rate to appre-
ciate further between 1980 and 1984 even though oil prices were gradually falling. Urban consumers ini-
tially beneﬁted from cheaper imports, but agricultural production and exports fell. This led to a loss in
GDP and higher dependency on oil. This ultimately led to a devaluation and ﬁscal austerity measures.
In a third macroeconomic scenario, in addition to the targets set in scenarios 1 and 2,
it is also assumed that the quality of governance and the defense of property rights are
improved. The effect of this policy is another substantive boost in the rate of private invest-
ment to 11.9 percent of GDP. As a consequence, real per capita growth increases to 2.4 per-
cent per annum. This reduces the poverty head count in 1996 to 39.4 percent when the
scenario is applied from 1980 onwards.
In a fourth and last scenario, it is assumed that aggressive measures are taken to boost
real per-capita growth to 3.3 percent per annum. First, in addition to the targets set in the
scenarios above, it is assumed that Nigeria moves closer to the ﬁnancial outcome of the fast
growing nations, with the result that the stock of domestic credit to the private sector is
increased to 30 percent of GDP. Second, TOT volatility in this scenario is reduced to half the
1980–94 average. As a result of these measures, the private sector investment rate is increased
to an average of 12.7 percent of GDP and the real per capita GDP growth rate rises to
3.3 percent. The counterfactual head count of poverty is 33.2 percent in 1996 when the sce-
nario is applied from 1980 onwards, leading to a reduction of poverty of almost 40 percent
versus the baseline case of 54.9 percent of the population in poverty.
The results are summarized in Table 7.4 and Figure 7.2, where the ﬁrst vertical bar pro-
vides the actual poverty measures observed in Nigeria, and subsequent vertical bar refer to
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Table 7.4. Per Capita GDP Growth and Poverty Scenarios, 1980–96
Outcomes Policy Targets
Benchmarks,
1980–94a
Nigeria
(baseline case) 0.2 7.2 54.9 25.3 14.8 0.36 0.25 14 55 0.23 0.43
High growth 
economiesb 4.2 20.4 — — — 0.07 0.16 44 90 0.06 0.65
Macroeconomic
scenarios
Scenario 1 1.5 9.3 45.5 19.5 10.9 0.12 0.16 17 — — —
Scenario 2 1.9 9.5 42.4 17.9 9.9 0.12 0.16 17 65 0.17 —
Scenario 3 2.4 11.9 39.4 16.0 8.7 0.12 0.16 17 65 0.17 0.65
Scenario 4 3.3 12.7 33.2 12.9 6.8 0.12 0.16 30 65 0.12 0.65
a. Benchmarks for ﬁscal data are based on averages for 1993–2001. All others are based on
averages for 1980–94.
b. Average for volatility of public investment rate excludes outlier observations for Lesotho 
and Singapore.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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Figure 7.2. Poverty Under Alternative Macroeconomic Scenarios
the baseline case and the four scenarios. The impact of the alternative scenarios on poverty
for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures is very similar to that observed for
the headcount, as expected.
Conclusion
Policymakers seeking growth have faced strong challenges over the course of Nigerian his-
tory. Among these have been deep losses from a civil war, drought, disease and pests, and
extremely volatile terms of trade due to oil price shocks. The war appears to have caused
the deepest losses, both in terms of lives lost and in terms of economic losses. Yet, the
economy rebounded when the war ended. However, oil volatility and real exchange rate
uncertainty have continued to penalize growth and private investment, and thereby to lead
to high levels of poverty.
While our results indicate a large negative impact of volatility on private investment and
growth over the period 1980–94, and thereby a large negative impact on poverty, which was
captured in Nigeria’s 1996 household survey, the subsequent period has been one of sub-
stantive changes. Some of the key events include: the transition from military to civilian
rule in 1999, the change from a ﬁxed ofﬁcial exchange rate for government use to a more
market determined exchange rate system in 1999, and the end of a drought, but also sharp
ﬂuctuations in the price of oil and escalating government expenditures especially at the local
government level. A new household survey being implemented in 2004 in Nigeria should
tell us whether these changes have been important and positive enough led to a reduction
in poverty.
Finally, although we have not discussed this here, it is worth pointing out that volatility
is detrimental for what has been referred to as the risk-adjusted standard of living of the
poor, which is simply a measure of welfare that adjusts nominal income or consumption
for their variability, on the basis of assumptions regarding the degree of risk aversion of
households (see, for example, Makdissi and Wodon 2003). In simpler terms, most house-
holds would prefer to avoid large ﬂuctuations in income or consumption over time. The
consequences for the poor of income (or consumption) volatility over time can be especially
negative as they may be forced to make decisions to survive that can be detrimental in the
long run, such as selling assets or curtailing food intake. Said differently, standards of living
would be higher, and poverty lower in a country with a similar mean level of income or
consumption as Nigeria, but with lower volatility. Volatility, apart from having a negative
impact on investment and growth, thus has a direct negative impact on households through
a higher variation in their income or consumption from year to year. If we had taken into
account these effects in the analysis, the negative impact of volatility on poverty would have
been even stronger, because apart from the impact of volatility on growth and thereby
mean income and consumption levels, we would have had to also factor in the direct neg-
ative impact of volatility in itself on households.
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